Trang chủInternational FootballDortmund's €21.7 Million Loss: The €33.9 Million Accounting Trap the Headline Is Hiding
International Football

Dortmund's €21.7 Million Loss: The €33.9 Million Accounting Trap the Headline Is Hiding

Core answer: Borussia Dortmund lỗ ròng 21,7 triệu euro trong năm tài chính 2025/26, do doanh thu giảm 12,5% xuống 460,5 triệu euro sau khi bị loại sớm ở Champions League và DFB Cup. Khoản lãi chuyển nhượng 59,3 triệu euro đã bù đắp phần lớn thâm hụt. Key facts: - Doanh thu giảm 12,5%, từ 526 triệu euro xuống 460,5 triệu euro. - Doanh thu bản quyền truyền hình giảm 30,3%, từ 103,4 triệu xuống 72,1 triệu euro. - Lỗ ròng 21,7 triệu euro, so với khoản lãi 6,5 triệu euro của kỳ trước. - Lãi chuyển nhượng đạt 59,3 triệu euro, tăng 21,4 triệu euro so với kỳ trước. - Vốn chủ sở hữu khoảng 300 triệu euro, tỷ lệ vốn trên 50%, không có nợ mới. Source attribution: Goal.com, công bố năm 2025. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Related Q&A: Q: Vì sao Dortmund lỗ 21,7 triệu euro? A: Do bị loại sớm ở Champions League và DFB Cup khiến doanh thu bản quyền và tiền thưởng giảm mạnh. Q: Dortmund có gặp nguy hiểm tài chính không? A: Không, vì vốn chủ sở hữu khoảng 300 triệu euro và tỷ lệ vốn trên 50% giúp chịu được nhiều năm lỗ. Q: FIFA Club World Cup ảnh hưởng thế nào đến báo cáo? A: 33,9 triệu euro được ghi vào 2024/25 và chỉ 11,2 triệu ghi vào 2025/26, làm sai lệch so sánh giữa hai năm.

On the night of February 19, 2026, I woke at 3 a.m. Incheon time to watch Dortmund play their Champions League play-off against Atalanta Bergamo. The apartment was silent. My husband was fast asleep beside me. There was only the glowing screen, the commentary switching between Korean and English, and the beat of my heart following every ball. Dortmund lost. They were eliminated from the Champions League at the play-off stage, while the club leadership had built its financial plan around reaching the quarter-finals.

Nearly a year later, the number appeared on Goal.com: Dortmund lost 21.7 million euros in the 2026/26 financial year. The headline used the word "alarming." But when I opened the balance sheet and read it, I laughed. Not because the loss was fake. But because the way this story is being told hides the most important thing.

I have followed German football since 2026, from the days I sat in the newsroom of Báo Bóng đá in Hanoi. I have read thousands of financial reports from European clubs. And this 21.7 million euro loss, if you only read the first line, will make you misunderstand Dortmund entirely.

To understand Dortmund, you have to understand where their money comes from. In the 2026/25 season, total club revenue reached 460.5 million euros. That sounds large, but it had fallen 12.5 percent from the previous period's 526 million euros. In European football, revenue dropping by more than 60 million euros in one year is an event, not a small number.

Dortmund's revenue structure has three pillars: broadcasting rights, commercial and matchday income, and player transfers. The broadcasting pillar is the most fragile. Last season, Dortmund earned 103.4 million euros from broadcasting. This season, the figure fell to 72.1 million euros. A decline of 30.3 percent, equivalent to 31.3 million euros evaporating from a single revenue line.

To grasp the severity, compare. Broadcasting accounts for only about 15.7 percent of Dortmund's total revenue. Yet it contributed 48 percent of the total 65.5 million euro revenue decline. A single small revenue line produced nearly half the shock. This is the lesson of risk concentration: you can diversify revenue as much as you like, but if one line swings hard, it still drags the whole balance sheet down.

For someone who has followed German football since the 1980s, this is what I have warned about for a long time. The Bundesliga does not sell broadcasting rights at Premier League prices. When a German club does not go deep in the Champions League, it has no safety net from domestic TV contracts to compensate. Every knockout match is a direct financial gamble.

Look at what happened last season. Dortmund lost to Atalanta in the Champions League play-off. They were also eliminated in the round of 16 of the DFB Cup, losing to Bayer Leverkusen. Two early exits. Two times losing revenue the leadership had budgeted for. The leadership stated plainly in its release: the early cup exits were the main reason for the deficit.

This is where I want you to stop and look at the real number. Dortmund lost 21.7 million euros net. But in the same period, they earned 59.3 million euros from player transfers, up 21.4 million euros from the previous period.

If you add the 21.7 million loss to the 59.3 million transfer profit, you see something frightening: Dortmund's core operating business, excluding player sales, is losing roughly 81 million euros. This is the truth buried under the headline: Dortmund does not make money from football, they make money from selling players.

Let me be clearer. A normal club makes money from tickets, shirts, sponsorship and broadcasting. Dortmund does those things too, and does them fairly well. But when you subtract player wages, transfer amortization and stadium operating costs, what remains is not enough. The 59.3 million transfer profit is the float keeping Dortmund afloat.

And that float, this year, is 21.4 million euros thicker than last year. Meaning Dortmund sold more people, or sold people for more, to cover the operating loss. The leadership admits this. Carsten Cramer, spokesman for the BVB leadership, said plainly: they want to make Dortmund less dependent on transfer income.

I read that line and immediately thought of one thing. When a club says it wants to depend less on selling players, what it is really saying is: its talent production machine is starting to have problems. Either young-player prices are being pushed up, or rivals are competing more fiercely to raid academies.

This is the number the report does not state, but I can infer it. With an operating loss of roughly 81 million euros before player sales, and broadcasting revenue of only 72.1 million euros, Dortmund's wage bill is almost certainly several times larger than its broadcasting revenue. The wage-to-revenue ratio, the most important missing figure in this report, is where the real risk hides.

And there is another layer of danger few mention: UEFA's squad cost control rule. Under the financial sustainability rules in force since 2026, a club in European competition may spend at most 70 percent of revenue on player wages, transfer amortization and agent fees. When Dortmund's revenue falls, the denominator of that fraction falls too. If costs do not fall correspondingly, Dortmund will approach the 70 percent threshold, and the risk of fines or squad-size restrictions will emerge.

There is one more accounting detail I want you to remember, because it will make you misread next year's report. The 2026 FIFA Club World Cup brought Dortmund 45.1 million euros in prize money. But that money was split across two accounting periods: 33.9 million euros booked in 2026/25, and only 11.2 million euros booked in 2026/26.

What does this mean? Dortmund's 2026/25 was inflated by 33.9 million euros from the tournament in the United States. And 2026/26 was dragged down because it received only 11.2 million. When you compare the two years, you are comparing a year with Club World Cup money against a year with almost none. Anyone reading the 12.5 percent decline without knowing this is comparing apples to oranges.

So is Dortmund in danger? Looking at the balance sheet, the answer is no. Club equity is around 300 million euros. The equity-to-assets ratio exceeds 50 percent. And most importantly: no new debt, no overdraft drawn.

In European football, this is a nearly perfect balance sheet. Most giants, including champions, carry debt. Barcelona, Manchester United, Juventus all have net debt. Dortmund does not. With 300 million euros in equity, Dortmund could absorb two to three more years of losses at the 21.7 million euro level without falling into insolvency.

This is where I go against the crowd. The headline "Dortmund's alarming loss" is true, but it distracts from the real problem.

The real problem is not the 21.7 million euro loss. The real problem is that Dortmund's business model is stuck. They are a star-exporting club: buy cheap, develop, sell high. That model brought them Jadon Sancho, Erling Haaland, Jude Bellingham. But that model also means on-field performance is always a bet on finding the next gem.

The star-exporting model is not a moral weakness; many clubs live off it. But it is a structural weakness. When you build a budget on selling players, you depend on a market you do not control. Player prices can collapse after an economic crisis. A young player can get injured and lose value. A rival can pay higher wages and steal your gem.

In the Bundesliga picture, Dortmund sit in the chasing pack behind Bayern Munich. They are a regular Champions League side, but not the default champion. That position means every season Dortmund must fight Bayer Leverkusen, RB Leipzig and others for a Champions League spot. And every lost Champions League spot is a large revenue line evaporating.

When the leadership says it wants to depend less on transfers, it is admitting that finding gems like Bellingham is getting harder. Big academies face fierce competition. Premier League clubs are willing to pay 50 million euros for an 18-year-old. Dortmund cannot keep winning that game forever.

I could be wrong. Perhaps Dortmund are just having a bad year, and next season they will go deep in the Champions League, revenue will bounce back, and everything returns to normal. But if I am right, then this is the first sign of a slow crisis, a crisis that comes not from losing money, but from losing the ability to make it.

I remember a story from 2026. I sat in the press conference after Incheon United lost 0-3 to Jeonbuk. The room was all men. I asked the coach directly a question no one dared to ask. The room went silent for ten seconds. When the press room goes silent, I know I have touched the exact sore spot.

With Dortmund, the sore spot is not the loss. The sore spot is that they know they depend on an unsustainable model, but do not know how to change without losing their identity. Transfers are not science; they are a drama of greed and ego. And Dortmund are in the middle of that drama.

In Vietnam, I have seen many V.League clubs live off the sponsorship of a single owner and collapse when that owner walks away. Dortmund do not face that fate, because they are a members' club, not one person's toy. But the lesson is the same: a club cannot live forever by selling off its own future.

I bet that within two to three seasons, Dortmund will have to choose between two paths: either sell another star to balance the books, or accept stepping back in European competition to rebuild the foundation. I bet they will choose the second path, not because they are brave, but because they have no other choice.

People hate me because I speak first, then remember me because I was right. When Dortmund publish next season's financial report, come back and read this piece. If revenue does not bounce back, and the transfer profit is again the thing keeping them afloat, then you will know I was right.

Signal Iduna Park holds more than 81,000 people, the largest in Germany. On match nights, the whole Ruhr region pours in, and the atmosphere is so loud you can hear it through a screen. But when the financial balance sheet is published, there is no singing. Only numbers. And numbers, sometimes, tell a sadder story than a defeat.

I still stay up until 3 a.m. to watch matches no one cares about. Not because I like those matches. But because I want to understand what is really happening behind the scoreline. Dortmund are teaching all of Europe a lesson: in modern football, winning on the pitch and winning on the balance sheet are two different matches. And a club that wins only one of them will soon lose both.